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Uninsured Motorist Coverage, Company
Insolvency, and The Ohio Insurance
Guaranty Association Act
Mario C. Ciano*
IT IS NOT OFTEN THAT A LEGISLATIVE EVENT and a happenstance of life
converge almost simultaneously upon a specific and narrow issue of
law. This is precisely what occurred in Ohio in the latter part of 1970.
In that year, the legislature amended the Ohio Uninsured Motorist
Statute to declare, in effect, that a vehicle would be considered "un-
insured" when the company insuring that vehicle for some reason
became financially insolvent. The amendment became effective Oc-
tober 1, 1970. That same year the legislature enacted legislation to
provide a fund from which claims could be paid in the eventuality
that an insurance company became bankrupt. That statutory frame-
work, the Ohio Insurance Guaranty Association Act, became effective
September 4, 1970. Strangely, as events would have it, the Ohio Valley
Insurance Company, a domestic automobile liability carrier, was
caught in financial straits and was officially declared insolvent in
November of that same year.
This series of events precipitates the present inquiry into the gen-
eral area of company insolvency and its effects on uninsured motorist
coverage, as well as the relationship between the attachment of such
coverage and the Guaranty Association Act.
Company Insolvency and Uninsured Motorists
The tremendous increase in the number of automobiles on the
country's highways after World War II brought about a corresponding
increase in the number of traffic victims. In turn, many of the injured
were victims of negligent and financially irresponsible motorists, af-
fording little or no source of compensation. By the early 1950's, con-
siderable public sentiment and political pressure were brought to
bear for legislative or insurance contractual schemes to provide a
source of compensation for those injured by uninsured or hit-and-run
motorists, Representatives of private insurance companies came up
with a remedy to the problem in New York by offering to introduce
a new type of insurance coverage which would indemnify an insured
for injuries caused by a negligent uninsured motorist.' The so-called
"uninsured motorist" or "family protection" endorsement has now
become standard in virtually every state in which automobile liability
insurance is written, as a result of both voluntary inclusion of such
*Of the law firm of Hinslea, Reminger & Reminger (Cleveland); Member of the Ohio
Bar.
1 See, Caverly New Provisions for Protection from Injuries Inflicted by an Uninsured
Jutomobile, 396 INs. L. J. 19, 20 (1956).
1Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1972
21 CLEV. ST. L. R. (1)
coverage by the insurance companies and compulsory legislation
requiring it. 2
Basically, the coverage works as follows. In the event of an
accident caused by the negligence of an uninsured motorist, the in-
sured, as defined by the policy, is placed in the same position he
would have been had the negligent motorist carried insurance coverage
within certain limits. In order for the insured to recover from his
own insurance company, he must prove that the uninsured motorist
or a hit-and-run motorist was at fault, resulting in injuries. The deter-
mination of whether the insured is legally entitled to recover is re-
stricted to the compulsory arbitration of the dispute. Despite the
general scope and intent of the coverage as outlined above, one must
not assume that the inclusion of such coverage in one's policy pro-
vides the insured with a ready source of indemnification in all cases
where he is injured as a result of negligence by an unidentified hit-
and-run driver, or an otherwise uninsured motorist. Indeed, the in-
sured has basic elements of proof to satisfy on arbitration. He, of
course, has to deal with the issues of negligence as well as the cor-
responding defenses. However, a prerequisite to these questions is
the attachment of uninsured motorist coverage itself in a particular
set of circumstances. One of the elements to the attachment of cover-
age in the first place is whether indeed the adverse motorist was in
fact "uninsured". This issue often is determined by the definition of
precisely what constitutes an "uninsured motor vehicle", whether that
definition be contained in the policy itself, or less often, in a state
statute.3 Accordingly, no sooner had uninsured motorist coverage
been offered than a body of case law started to develop, defining the
bounds of such coverage in disputes between the insured and the
carrier.
Strangely enough, one area of conflict as to the attachment of the
uninsured motorist coverage has been precipitated by the unfortunate
event of an insurance company itself becoming "financially irrespon-
sible", so to speak. More precisely, the question arises as to what occurs
when a motorist, acting in good faith, purchases liability insurance
coverage with a particular company. Thereafter, he is involved in an
accident wherein he is negligent and another party is injured. When
the injured party makes a claim against the negligent driver, he
finds that much to his dismay, the driver's insurance carrier has
2 E.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3937.18 (Baldwin 1971).
3 Indeed, although most states have legislation which requires the inclusion of uninsured
motorist coverage on all automobile liability insurance written in the state, few, if any,
statutory schemes are any more specific relative to the scope and terms of the coverage
afforded. See WIDIsS, A GunE TO UNINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE, 16 (1969). For ex-
ample, when OHIO REVISED CODE, § 3937.18 was first adopted in 1965, the statutory
requirement was simply that uninsured motorist coverage be offered, without defining
any conditions to the attachment of such coverage. It was not until the statute was
amended in 1970 that a partial definition of what constitutes an uninsured motor vehicle
was provided. OHIO REV. CODE ANN., § 3937.19(B) (Baldwin 1971).
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become insolvent. Of course, this set of circumstances make the negli-
gent driver just as "financially irresponsible" as he would have been
had he in fact never been insured. Assuming that the injured party
was himself insured under a liability policy which included uninsured
motorist coverage, could the injured party, under the above circum-
stances, make a claim against his own carrier, claiming that the negli-
gent motorist, as things turned out, was indeed "uninsured"?
As could be expected, courts have given different answers to the
question in construing the endorsement language first incorporated
into insurance policies. It was in 1956 that the insurance industry
adopted a Standard Uninsured Motorist Endorsement to be incor-
porated into policies issued. The 1956 endorsement defined the term,
"uninsured automobile" to mean, "an automobile with respect to
... which there is no bodily injury liability bond or insurance policy
applicable at the time of the accident . ... ,4 (Emphasis added.)
A number of insurance companies presented with this situation
denied coverage to the insured on the basis that the automobile of the
tortfeasor was not "an uninsured automobile", since there was indeed
an insurance policy "applicable at the time of the accident". When the
question was litigated, many courts agreed with the companies' posi-
tion, stating that uninsured motorist coverage did not attach by the
clear and unambiguous terms of the endorsement. 5 Of course, such
an interpretation did violence to the initial policy considerations
which gave rise to uninsured motorist coverage in the first place -
that is, a source of compensation for injuries caused by uninsured
motorists. Accordingly, a number of courts held that the endorse-
ment language would not be construed literally but rather with an
eye to the underlying public policy to provide protection to the
insured as evidenced by the many statutory provisions which made
such uninsured motorist coverage mandatory in all policies. Accord-
ingly, the uninsured motorist endorsement would be construed to
achieve that end, and a tortfeasor motorist would be considered un-
insured whenever he actually had no insurance to cover the claim
against him - for whatever reason, including his company's bank-
ruptcy. 6
It should be noted that some courts resolved the "company in-
solvency issue" to provide uninsured motorist coverage to the insured
by virtue of a language change made by the industry in the definition
of uninsured automobile in 1963. That year, an uninsured automobile
4 THE NATIONAL BUREAU OF CASUALTY UNDERWRITERS, 1956 STANDARD FORM, PART II:
DEFINITIONS ("Uninsured Automobile.").
5 See Apotas v. Allstate Ins. Co., 246 A.2d 923 (Del. 1968) ; Dreher v. Aetna Cas. & Sur.
Co., 83 Ill. App. 2d 141, 226 N.E.2d 287 (1967) ; Mich. Mut. Lia. Co. v. Pokerwinski, 8
Mich. App. 475, 154 N.W.2d, 609 (1967).
6 See Katz v. American Motorist Ins. Co., 244 Cal. App. 2d 886, 53 Cal. Rptr. 669 (1966);
Stephens v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 182 Neb. 562, 156 N.W.2d 133 (1968) ; State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Brower, 204 Va. 887, 134- S.E.2d 277 (1964).
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was defined in the Stnadard Form Endorsement as "an automobile
... with respect to which there is a bodily injury liability bond or
insurance policy applicable at the time of the accident, but the company
writing same denies coverage thereunder."7 (emphasis added) These
courts reasoned that the inability of the tortfeasor's carrier to defend
or pay a claim because of insolvency was equivalent to a "denial of
coverage."8
As more and more courts where adhering to the view that
insolvency would be viewed as the equivalent of denial of cover-
age by a tortfeasor's carrier, and as more and more state legis-
latures were specifically adopting amendments to their uninsured
motorist statutes requiring the attachment of uninsured motorist
coverage in the event of the insolvency on the part of the tortfeasor's
insurance company, the insurance industry, on May 1, 1966, adopted
a specific endorsement change to the effect that the term "uninsured
automobile" would be defined as:
an automobile with respect to which there is a bodily injury lia-
bility insurance policy applicable at the time of the accident, but
the company writing same becomes insolvent.9 (Emphasis added.)
It should be noted that although most insurance companies in-
corporate into their policy the standard coverage provision for the
uninsured motorist endorsement promulgated by the industry, many
companies do not always conform. Because of choice or statutory
directives in other states, such companies may have an uninsured
motorist endorsement with language variations from the proposed
standard form. Also, there is no absolute uniformity in the adoption of
the proposed standard form at the same time. Accordingly, while some
companies may be issuing policies with the 1966 Standard Endorse-
ment, others may indeed still be using the language of a prior standard
endorsement or some variation of it.
To remove any doubt on the insolvency issue and to resolve any
conflicting policy language contained in policies issued in Ohio, the
legislature moved to amend the Ohio Uninsured Motorist Statute.
Effective October 1, 1970, H.B. 620 added a specific definition of an
uninsured motor vehicle as follows:
For the purpose of this section, a motor vehicle is uninsured if
the liability insurer denies coverage or is or becomes the subject
of insolvency proceedings in any jurisdiction.10 (Emphasis added.)
In comparing the 1966 insurance industry endorsement and the
quoted Ohio statute, it would appear that the two differ only as to
7 THE NATIONAL BUREAU OF CASUALTY UNDERWRITERS, 1963 STANDARD FORM, PART I[:
DEFINITIONS ("Uninsured Automobile.").
$ Accord, Bendelow v. Traveler's Indem. Co., 57 Misc. 2d 327, 293 N.Y.S.2d 629 (1968)
Pattani v. Keystone Ins. Co., 426 Pa. 332, 231 A.2d 402 (1967) (decided under Pa.
statute).
9THE NATIONAL BUREAU OF CASUALTY UNDERWRITERS, 1966 STANDARD FORM, PART V:
ADDITIONAL DEFINITIONS ("Uninsured Highway Vehicle").
10 OHIO REv. CODE ANN., § 3937.18(B) (Baldwin 1971).
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the time when uninusred motorist coverage can be said to attach. It
will be noted that the 1966 Endorsement requires that the insurance
company insuring the tortfeasor's vehicle "become insolvent". On its
face, it would seem that the judicial decree of insolvency would be
required. On the other hand, the Ohio statutory language attaches
coverage when the tortfeasor's insurer "is or becomes the subject of
insolvency proceedings." Under this wording, it would seem that an
insured could make a claim under his uninsured motorist coverage as
soon as insolvency proceedings would be instituted against the tort-
feasor's carrier, in which case, there would be no need to wait until
an official insolvency decree was issued. Accordingly, by virtue of
H.B. 620, and by virtue of the fact that it can be assumed that many
companies underwriting insurance in Ohio have policies containing
the 1966 Endorsement language, it would seem clear that in this
state, at least, the onset of company insolvency gives rise to the
attachment of uninsured motorist coverage.
Unfortunately, one cannot be more specific than the above state-
ment and many questions relative to timing and application remain.
The 1970 Ohio Legislature had an opportunity to do a thorough
drafting job on the uninsured motorist statute as a whole and remove
many areas of litigation between the insureds and their carriers.
Secondly, it had an opportunity when adding Paragraph B, speaking
directly to the insolvency issue, to make specific provisions especially
relating to the question of the time when the uninsured coverage
would attach because of insolvency. Specifically, the insolvency pro-
vision added in 1970, leaves the following questions unanswered:
1. Must the insolvency definition be incorporated only in the
policies issued or renewed after October 1, 1970, or is that def-
inition incorporated as a matter of law into policies issued or
renewed before that time, but whose term does not expire
until after October 1, 1970?
2. Does the effective date speak to the date of an accident or to
the date when a company "becomes subject to insolvency pro-
ceedings"?
A little reflection will indicate the various possibilities. First, a
company may in fact be insolvent or at least be subject to insolvency
proceedings at the time an accident occurs. Therefore, a claimant
could initiate his uninsured motorist claim against his own company
at that time. On the other hand, a tortfeasor's carrier may be viable
at the time of an accident, but not be subject to insolvency proceed-
ings until a future time. Under present conditions of overcrowded
dockets, this timing can be significant and possibly encompass a
period of three, four, or more years. Indeed, a tortfeasor's carrier may
be precipitated into insolvency even after the plaintiff has obtained
a judgment against the tortfeasor and finds that there is no money
from which to collect. In such a case, would the claimant be at liberty
5Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1972
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to initiate an uninsured motorist claim against his carrier, even
though the accident occurred three or four years before? Although
many states have statutes which provide that the insolvency protec-
tion is to be applicable only where the insurer of the tortfeasor
becomes insolvent, usually within one, two, or three years after the
accident," the Ohio statute and the insurance industry's standard
uninsured motorist form are silent on the question.
Significantly, the time within which the insolvency is to occur
is also important for the reason that many policies contain a contrac-
tual period of limitation within which to assert an uninsured motorist
claim. Again, Ohio Revised Code, §3937.18 makes no provision relative
to the time limitation within which to assert an uninsured motorist
claim. Likewise, the standard endorsement is silent upon the issue.
However, many companies have modified the standard endorsement
and provided time limits within which to claim benefits under the
coverage.' 2 Accordingly, the claimant and his attorney may find them-
selves in a predicament under circumstances where he has been
negotiating with a tortfeasor's carrier for a period of possibly two
years after the accident has occurred and has felt no need to put his
own company on notice of a potential uninsured motorist claim. Sud-
denly, the tortfeasor's carrier becomes subject to insolvency proceed-
ings. Possibly, at this time, the claimant turns to his own company
asserting his rights under his uninsured motorist coverage. However,
by this time, he may find his company as a defense a contractual period
of limitation within which to present his claim. Now, while most
courts have felt that the "contract" rather than the "tort" statute of
limitation governs the assertion of an uninsured motorist claim by an
insured against his company,' 3 this has been in cases where the un-
insured motorist endorsement was silent on the issue and did not
specify any period. However, no cases have been found wherein the
policy specified a certain period within which an uninsured motor-
ist claim had to be asserted by the insured and generally, a contrac-
tual period of limitations placed in an insurance policy had been held
to be valid, in Ohio, at least, where that period is not unreasonable. 14
It is submitted that the above uncertainties facing both the claim-
ant-insured and the carrier could be eliminated by legislative action
to provide a period of limitation for the presentation of unin-
n See WIDISS, supra note 3, §3.9 at 140-41.
12 Id., § 2.26 at 55.
13 E.g. Hartford Accident and Indem. Co. v. Mason, 210 So.2d 474 (Fla. 1968); Booth v.
Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 207 So.2d, 925 (La. 1968) ; In re DeLuca, 17 N.Y.2d 76, 263
N.Y. Supp. 2d 299, 215 N.E.2d 482 (1966); Schulz v. Allstate Ins. Co., 17 Ohio Misc.
83 (Franklin County C. P. 1968). See generally Annot. 23 A. L. R. 3d. 580 (1969);
Aksen, Arbitration of Uninsured Motorist Endorsement Claims, 24 OHio ST. L. J. 589,
591 (1963) ; Hudak, Arbitration, Statute of Limitations, and Uninsured Motorist En-
dorsement, 19 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 528, 530-40 (1970).
14 Accord, Apple v. Cooper Ins. Co., 76 Ohio St. 52, 80 N.E. 955 (1907) ; Metz v. Buckeye
Union Fire Ins. Co., 104 Ohio App. 93, 147 N.E.2d, 119 (1957). See generally 30 Onlo
JUR. 2d, Insurance, §§ 961-70 (1958).
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sured motorist claims in general. It would appear that such claims
can neither be properly classified as "tort" or "contract". Correspond-
ingly, neither the two-year statutory period of limitation for per-
sonal injuries,15 nor the fifteen-year statutory period for the bringing
of a claim based on a written contract 16 is approapriate. Ideally, it
would seem that a time period between those two extremes, perhaps
a five-or six-year statute of limitations, would serve to ,protect
the claimant by providing a sufficient period within which the uncer-
tainties of proper liability insurance coverage of the adverse vehicle
can come to fruition. Also, such a period would serve the company's
interest in giving it a definitive cut-off time when the potential of an
uninsured motorist claim could be eliminated as a risk under the
policy.
Furthermore, it would appear desirable to provide a statutory
period speaking specifically to the insolvency issue herein dis-
cussed. A period can be provided within which the tortfeasor's
carrier must be subject to insolvency proceedings in order for
the uninsured motorist coverage to attach. Again, such a period
would have to be of suficient length to encompass the potential time
period necessitated for the total disposition of a personal injury
claim; that is, from the date of an accident to judgment and execution.
Thus, a claimant could be protected whether he finds the tortfeasor's
carrier insolvent at the time of an accident, before instituting suit,
after suit is instituted, or indeed after a judgment is obtained and he
attempts to collect on it. If the claimant finds that the tort-feasor's
carrier is insolvent at any of these stages, he can turn to his remedy
under his uninsured motorist coverage. Again, it would seem that a
period in the area of five to six years would be sufficient for this
purpose.
The Ohio Insurance Guaranty Association Act
The same legislature responsible for the amendment of Ohio's
uninsured motorist statute acted in a more comprehensive manner
to provide a mechanism for the payment of creditor claims in general,
in the unfortunate eventuality of an insurance company becoming in-
solvent. The Ohio Insurance Guaranty Association Act 1 7 was enacted
effective September 4, 1970. The Act creates a non-profit, unincor-
porated association to be known as the Ohio Insurance Guaranty As-
sociation.' 8 All insurance companies who write insurance in the State
of Ohio, with exception of certain enumerated specialty types of in-
surance, are to be members of the Association. 19 Membership is com-
15 See OHIO REv. CODE ANN., § 2305.10 (Baldwin 1971).
16 ee OHIo REv. CODE ANN., § 2305.06 (Baldwin 1971).
17 OHIO REV. CODE ANN., §§ 3955.01-.20 (Baldwin 1971).
17d. at § 3955.06(A).
19 Id. at § 3955.05 (Excluded Kinds of Insurance).
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pulsory as a condition of the company's authority to transact business
in this state. By virtue of the assessment of each member-company, 20
and through a plan of operation, the object of the Association is to
protect not only the policyholders of an insolvent company, but also
claimants, as well as assisting in detecting and hopefully preventing
insurer insolvencies in general.2 1 Generally speaking, in the handling
of claims involving an insolvent insurer, the Association in essence
steps into the latter's shoes.
The Ohio Valley Insolvency
No sooner had the ink dried on the legislative papers, than an
Ohio company was catapaulted into insolvency. On November 27,
1970, entry was filed, officially decreeing the Ohio Valley Insurance
Company as insolvent.2 2 Ohio Valley had an estimated 8,700 policy-
holders at that time. 23 Liquidation was ordered by the court and the
Superintendent of Insurance immediately notified the Guaranty
Association to activate the newly-formed administrative machinery in
the hope of having the many claims involving Ohio Valley covered by
the Asosciation. The Buckeye Union Insurance Company, a substan-
tial underwriter in this state, and a member-company of the Associa-
tion who would be proportionately assessed, challenged the applic-
ability of the Act to the Ohio Valley insolvency.
It was Buckeye's contention that irrespective of the fact that the
actual judicial decree of insolvency did not come until November 27,
1970, well after the effective date of the Guaranty Act, Ohio Valley
was in fact insolvent before the effective date of the Act, September
4, 1970. Accordingly, to require the Guaranty Association to take up
the existing claims of Ohio Valley would amount to a post de facto
law.24 On the other hand, the Superintendent of Insurance and the
intervening claimants contended that it was the date of the judicial
decree of insolvency which controlled and that this had occurred after
the effective date of the Act. 25 The trial court held for the Superin-
tendent and claimants and ordered the Guaranty Association was to
pay all of the claims of Ohio Valley.
Due to the stakes involved, it was certain that the case
would be appealed to the Supreme Court and so it was. The
Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals indicated that the
parties and the trial court had been wrongly putting the
emphasis on the date of insolvency. The Supreme Court stated that
what was determinative of which Ohio Valley claims were to be cov-
20 Id. at § 3955.08 (Association Powers and Duties).
21 Id. at § 3955.03 (Purpose).
22 Smith v. Ohio Valley Ins. Co., No. 241494 (Franklin County C. P., 1970).
23 The State Underwriter, Jan., 1971.
24 Smith v. Ohio Valley Ins. Co., 27 Ohio St. 2d 268, 271 (1971).
25 Id. at 272.
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ered under the Guaranty Act was the definition of a "covered claim"
as defined in the statute.2 6 The Court emphasized that the Act did not
require the Association to pay all claims, but only "covered claims"
existing prior to the determination that an insolvent insurer exists as
well as claims arising within thirty (30) days after such determina-
tion.2 7 A "covered claim" was specifically defined in the Act as "an un-
paid claim ... which arises out of and is within the coverage of an in-
surance policy.., when issued by an insurer which becomes an insol-
vent insurer on or after the effective date of this act ..... ,,28 Putting
these two provisions together, the Supreme Court held in Smith v. Ohio
Valley Insurance Co.29 that it was clear that the Guaranty Association
was to answer only for those claims which arose between September 4,
1970 and thirty (30) days after the insolvency decree, or December
27, 1970. Claims in existence or arising against Ohio Valley before the
effective date of the Act were excluded. Because of the dates involved,
the Supreme Court's ruling meant that approximately 75% of the
claims, or estimated liabilities of approximately $3,000,000.00, would
not come within the protective cloak of the Guaranty Association
Act. 30
Of course, a great portion of the outstanding claims, at least as
to the contingent liability of the Ohio Valley Insurance Company
were those represented by individuals who had been involved in auto-
mobile accidents with policyholders of Ohio Valley and had presented
claims for damages to that company. These claims were at various
stages of handling. Some were in the process of adjustment and
settlement negotiation, while litigation had already been instituted
with respect to many others. The court cases were suspended indef-
initely when the judicial decree of insolvency and order of liquida-
tion was handed down.
Now the claimants who claimed personal injury resulting from
the negligence of an Ohio Valley policyholder could be assumed to
have been of various classes within the context of our discussion. That
is, some of these claimants were themselves uninsured at the time
of the accident. As to these claimants, then, it would appear that if
the accident occurred either before September 4, 1970, or after
December 27, 1970, they were relegated to pursuing an uninsured
defendant. On the other hand, as to such claimants where the accident
occurred between those two dates, they could pursue the defendant
who would then be insured, in effect, by the Guaranty Association,
under the Smith"' decision.
2 6 
OHio REV. CODE ANN., § 3955.01(B) (Baldwin 1971).
27Id. at § 3955.08 (A) (1).28 Id. at § 39S5.01 (B).
29 Smith v. Ohio Valley Ins. Co., 27 Ohio St. 2d 268, 271 (1971).
30 The State Underwriter, May, 1971.
3 21 Ohio St. 2d 268 (1971).
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A second class of claimants would be those who were themselves
insured at the time of the accident involving an Ohio Valley policy-
holder. As to these individuals, more complicated situations can be
imagined. For example, some of these claimants could have been
insured under a policy with no insolvency provision. Assuming that
the accident date did not encompass the limited period between
September 4 and November 27, 1970, their claims would not be covered
by the Guaranty Association. An alternative remedy would be to
attempt to make an uninsured motorist claim against their own carrier.
However, without an insolvency provision in the policy, they would
be relegated to the split case law heretofore discussed, 32 as to whether
company insolvency gave rise to the attachment of uninsured motorist
coverage in absence of a specific provision in the policy. Which line
of cases an Ohio court would follow is of course unknown; however,
it would be anticipated that in view of the public policy expressed
by the legislature in the 1970 amendment of the Ohio Uninsured
Motorist Statute specifically directed to the insolvency issue, Ohio
courts would probably follow that line of cases favorable to the in-
sured's position. Of course, limited cases would be assumed where the
accident occurred subsequent to October 1, 1970, the effective date of
the insolvency amendment to the Ohio Uninsured Motorist Statute.
If indeed that amendment date would be held to apply to when an
accident occurred rather than the date of the issuance or renewal of
policies in this state, then the insured could argue that the insol-
vency provision was incorporated in his policy as a matter of law for
an accident subsequent to the effective date of October 1, 1970.
It will be noted that in the last discussed limited cases with acci-
dents occurring subsequent to October 1, 1970, their claims would also
appear to be covered by the Guaranty Association, as long as the
accident was not subsequent to December 27, 1970, the cut-off date
for such claims involving the Ohio Valley insolvency. In addition, it
can be assumed that probably the greater number of claimants insured
at the time of the occurrence involving an Ohio Valley policyholder
were themselves insured under a policy which probably had an insol-
vency provision comparable to the insurance industry's 1966 Standard
Form. As to these individuals, it would appear that if their policy
contained such a provision, they would have a legitimate claim under
their uninsured motorist coverage, regardless of when the accident
occurred. In addition, as to those individuals whose claims arose out
of accidents occurring between September 4, 1970 and December 27,
1970, they would also, ostensibly at least, have a claim against the
Guaranty Association. This possibility brings up the interesting ques-
tion of the relationship between the fund available under a claimant's
uninsured motorist coverage with his own carrier and the available
resources under the Guaranty Association Act. Assuming then, that
32 See text at nn. 4-9 supra.
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a claimant has a claim covered under either source, must he choose
one, or can he proceed against both?
Some analysis will indicate that the choice taken by such a claim-
ant will have a significant effect. If he proceeds against the Guaranty
Association, he will in essence do so very much as if he had pursued
the tortfeasor who was insured by a viable company, since by statute,
the Association assumes the role occupied by the insolvent carrier who
was insuring the tortfeasor. The Association, then, would insure the
tortfeasor in accordance with the limits and scope of coverage afforded
to him by the now defunct company. Accordingly, the claimant could
proceed to file suit if his claim was not settled by the Guaranty Asso-
ciation, and in turn, he could proceed to trial and consequent verdict,
if he is so fortunate. On the other hand, if such a claimant pursues
his remedy under his uninsured motorist coverage, he will have to
be satisfied by those limits of uninsured motorist coverage contained
in his policy. Generally speaking, the limits of uninsured motorist
coverage are the minimum amounts set forth in the state's so-called
"financial responsibility law."33 In Ohio, the usual afforded limits,
effective January 1, 1970, are $12,500.00 per person or $25,000.00 per
accident. 34 Of course, these limits may be lower than the limits con-
tained in the policy insuring the tortfeasor, under which the Associa-
tion would be obligated to defend. Furthermore, the non-settlement of
the uninsured motorist claim leaves as the only recourse compulsory
arbitration, without the choice of trial by jury.
The Guaranty Association Act seems to have a provision imping-
ing upon the choices discussed. The intention of the Act seems to be
making that fund one of "last resort" for claimants against the insol-
vent insurance company. Ohio Revised Code, §3955.13 (Recovery by
Persons Having Covered Claims) provides as follows:
(A) Any person having a covered claim upon which recovery is
also presently possible under an insurance policy written by
another insurer, shall be required first to exhaust his rights under
such policy. Any amount payable on a covered claim under ...
[the act] . . . shall be reduced by the amount of such recovery.
(Emphasis added)
Under that section, it seems that the claimant under discussion must
first exhaust his rights under his uninsured motorist coverage. There
seems to be no limitation in the statute that "another insurer" does not
include the claimant's own carrier. The last sentence of the quoted
language provides that the Association have a set-off against a covered
claim to the extent of the amount acquired from some other insurance
source. It is interesting to note that a claimant who has a potential
covered claim both under his uninsured motorist coverage as well as
against the Guaranty Fund is not specifically limited to one or the
33 E.g., Onio REV. CoDE ANN., §§ 4509.01-.99, (Baldwin 1971).
Z4 Id. at § 3937.18(A) referring to § 4509.20(A).
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other. Possibly, there is nothing in the Act to foreclose such a claim-
ant from proceeding both ways.
Assume in the above discussion that the uninsured motorist
coverage limit is $12,500.00, while the limit in the policy insuring the
tortfeasor, whose carrier is now bankrupt is $30,000.00. Assume fur-
ther that the claimant presents an uninsured motorist claim which
he loses in arbitration based on the facts. The reasons could be varied
-no negligence, contributory negligence, proximate cause, and so
forth. In such a circumstance, would the claimant then be permitted
to present a claim against the Guaranty Association? He can arguably
take the position that he has indeed exhausted his rights under his
policy and his is a "covered claim" to be dealt with by the Guaranty
Association. It is questionable whether the legal doctrine of res judi-
cata or estoppel preclude him from doing so. A second possibility is
that the claimant, rather than losing the arbitration hearing, does
indeed recover an award, however, he deems the amount inadequate
for his damages. Again, is he free to have a second try against the
Guaranty Association? The claimant would of course argue that again
he has exhausted his rights under his policy and that in his opinion,
his claim is worth more than the award albeit, he is willing to apply
the amount of the arbitration award to any amount he may recover
under the Guaranty Act, which of course could include formal trial.
The above possibilities of a claimant's having two sources to
satisfy his claim brings up further complications. A major one relates
to subrogation rights. Customarily, an insured who receives amounts
under his uninsured motorist coverage subrogates his rights against
the tortfeasor, pursuant to a receipt and trust agreement for the
amounts received and an agreement to subrogate. Now, in most cases,
the adverse tortfeasor is indeed uninsured in the usual sense and
recovery by the insured under his uninsured motorist coverage pre-
supposes a finding of fault on the part of such tortfeasor. Accordingly,
such an individual does not draw upon sympathies when the carrier
subrogates against him. However, in the case where the insured has
recovered under his uninsured motorist coverage, by virtue of the
fact that the tortfeasor was indeed at fault, but furthermore because
the tortfeasor's carrier became insolvent, then one questions the equity
of permitting the carrier to subrogate against the tortfeasor, who
at least acted in good faith in paying for insurance coverage, but,
through no fault of his own, that company became insolvent. Now,
the Ohio Insurance Guaranty Act appears to recognize the insured of
an insolvent carrier as more or less an innocent victim along with
the other claimants. Accordingly, although the Guaranty Association
enjoys subrogation rights of any person recovering under the Act,
it has no rights whatever against the insured of an insolvent carrier.35
35 Id at § 3955.12(A).
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However, while the Association is specifically precluded from pursuing
subrogation against such a tortfeasor, by statute, there is no such
prohibition, either in statutory or case law preventing the private
insurance carrier who had made a payment to its insured because of
the insolvency of the tortfeasor's carrier to proceed against that tort-
feasor in subrogation. As indicated, the equity of permitting this to
occur is suspect and possibly this could have been another area as
to which the Ohio legislature could have directed itself when it
amended the uninsured motorist statute to cover the insolvency
contingency.
Conclusion.
It has been seen that unilateral efforts by the insurance industry
itself as well as legislative action in the state of Ohio have moved to
alleviate the potential hardships arising from the unfortunate demise
of an automobile casualty underwriter. However, it would appear that
the action taken by both has raised as many questions and probably
engendered as much litigation as it was hoped to have eliminated. At
this juncture at least, it will be up to the courts to provide the answers
to the possibilities raised. It is hoped, however, that the insurance
industry itself would re-evaluate its uninsured motorist coverage
endorsement in general, and its insolvency provision in particular, and
make specific provision speaking to the questions raised, especially
relative to the time limits for the assertion of uninsured motorist
claims. Likewise, the legislature can act in like manner and provide
a degree of uniformity to the area and correlate the legislative provi-
sions directed to the issue of insurance company insolvency so as to
provide an equitable framework for both the insured and his carrier
and to eliminate the uncertainties discussed.
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